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ABSTRACT Thispaperconsiderstheappropriaterolefor
government in the support of scientific and technological
progress in health care; the information the federal govern-
ment needs to make well-informed decisions about its role;
and the ways that federal policy toward research and devel-
opment should respond to scientific advances, technology
trends, and changes in the political and social environment.
Theprincipaljustificationforgovernmentsupportofresearch
rests upon economic characteristics that lead private markets
to provide inappropriate levels of research support or to
supply inappropriate quantities of the products that result
from research. The federal government has two basic tools for
dealing with these problems: direct subsidies for research and
strengthened property rights that can increase the revenues
that companies receive for the products that result from
research. In the coming years, the delivery system for health
care will continue to undergo dramatic changes, new research
opportunities will emerge at a rapid pace, and the pressure to
limit discretionary federal spending will intensify. These
forces make it increasingly important to improve the mea-
surementofthecostsandbenefitsofresearchandtorecognize
the tradeoffs among alternative policies for promoting inno-
vation in health care.
In this paper, we address three general questions. What role
shouldthefederalgovernmentplayinsupportingscientificand
technological progress in health care? What information
should the federal government collect to make well-informed
decisions about its role? How should federal policy toward
research and development respond to scientific advances,
technology trends, and changes in the political and social
environments?
To address these questions, we adopt a societal perspective,
considering the costs and benefits of research funding to
American society as a whole. Both in government and in the
private sector, narrower perspectives usually predominate. For
example, a federal agency may consider only the direct costs
that it bears. A device manufacturer may weigh only the direct
costs and benefits for the firm. Both organizations will thereby
ignore costs and benefits that accrue to members of the public.
Thesocietalperspectivetakesaccountofallcostsandbenefits.
Although alternative perspectives are appropriate in some
circumstances, the comprehensiveness of the societal perspec-
tive makes it the usual point of departure for discussions of
government policy. Much of our discussion focuses on deci-
sions that are made by the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
the largest federal agency devoted to biomedical research, but
our comments also apply to other federal agencies sponsoring
scientific research.
The approach we adopt is that of neoclassical, ‘‘Paretian’’
welfare economics (1). This approach dictates that potential
changes in policy should be evaluated by comparing the total
costs and benefits to society. It suggests that only those policies
whose benefits exceed their costs should be adopted. When
they are accompanied by an appropriate system of transfers,
these policies can improve the welfare of everyone. As is
typical in cost–benefit analysis (CBA), we focus on total costs
and benefits and do not address the more detailed questions
about how gains should be distributed among members of the
public. By adopting this approach to measuring policy-making,
we simplify the analysis and can draw upon a well-developed
intellectual tradition (2).
We start by outlining a theoretical framework for organizing
thediscussionoftheseissues.Theusualanalysisofgovernment
policy toward science and technology marries the notion of
market failure—the failure of markets to satisfy the conditions
necessary for economic efficiency—and the notion of a rate of
return to research. These concepts have helped to structure
thinking about these issues, but they are too limiting for our
purposes. We propose a broader framework that compares the
benefits from more rapid technological change with the costs
associated with two possible mechanisms for financing it:
expanded property rights (which creates monopoly power) and
tax-financed subsidies. Expanded property rights could take
the form of longer patent life or more broadly defined patent
and copyright protection for intellectual property. Tax-
financed subsidies could take the form of government-funded
(extramural) research, government-performed research (e.g.,
intramural research at NIH), government subsidies to private
research,andgovernment-subsidizedtraining.Optimalpolicy,we
claim,usesamixofexpandedpropertyrightsandsubsidies.Thus,
policymakers must address two distinct questions. Is the total
level of support for research and development adequate? Is the
balance between subsidies and monopoly power appropriate?
These questions arise in any setting in which innovation is a
concern. After we define the fundamental concepts used in
discussions of technology policy, we show that the choice
between monopoly power and subsidies arises within a private
firm just as it does at the level of the nation. After describing
this analytical framework, we then ask how it can be used to
guide government policy decisions. Specifically, what kinds of
data would policymakers need to collect to make informed
decisions about both questions? Such data would enable a
government agency engaged in research funding to set and
justify overall spending levels and to set spending priorities
across different areas of its budget. It would also be able to
advise other branches of government about issues such as
patent policy that can have far-reaching implications for the
health care sector.
Theoretical Framework
Market Failure and Public Goods. The central theme of
microeconomic analysis is the economic efficiency of the
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12717idealized competitive market. There are many forms of market
failure—departuresfromthisideal.Twoofthemostimportant
are monopolistic control of specific goods and incomplete
property rights. Many discussions treat research as a public
good and presume that the underlying market failure is one of
incompletepropertyrights.Thissuggeststhatifwecouldmake
the protection for intellectual property rights strong enough, we
could return to the competitive ideal. In fact, a true public good
is one that presents policymakers with an unavoidable choice
between monopoly distortions and incomplete property rights.
There are two elements in the definition of a public good.
It must be nonrival, meaning that one individual’s consump-
tion of the good does not diminish the quantity available for
others to use. It must also be nonexcludable. Once it is
produced, anyone can enjoy the benefits it offers, without
getting the consent of the producer of the good (3).
Incomplete excludability causes the kind of market failure
we expect to observe when property rights are not well
specified. When a rival good such as a common pasture is not
excludable, it is overused and underprovided. Society suffers
froma‘‘tragedyofthecommons.’’Thedirectwaytorestorethe
conditions needed for an efficient outcome is to establish
property rights and let a price system operate. For example, it
is possible to divide up the commons, giving different people
ownershipofspecificplotsofland.Theownerscanthencharge
grazing fees for the use of the land. When there are so many
landholders that no one person has a monopoly on land, these
grazing fees give the owners of livestock the right incentives to
conserve on the use of the commons. They also give landown-
ers the right incentives to clear land and create new pasture.
When it is prohibitively expensive to establish property rights
and a price system, as in the case of fish in the sea, the
government can use licensing and quotas to limit overuse. It
can also address the problem of underprovision by directly
providing the good, for example by operating hatcheries.
For our purposes, the key observation is that these unmit-
igated benefits from property rights are available for rival
goods. Nonrival goods pose a distinct and more complicated
set of economic problems that are not widely appreciated. Part
of the difficulty arises from the obscurity of the concept of
rivalry itself. The term rival means that two persons must vie
for the use of a particular good such as a fish or plot of land.
A defining characteristic of research is that it produces non-
rival goods—bits of information that can be copied at zero
cost. It was costly to discover the basic information about the
structure of DNA, but once that knowledge had been uncov-
ered, unlimited numbers of copies of it could be made and
distributed to biomedical researchers all over the world. By
definition, it is impossible to overuse a nonrival good. There
is no waste when every laboratory in the world can make use
of knowledge about the structure of DNA. There is no tragedy
in the intellectual commons. For a detailed discussion of
nonrivalry and its implications for technology development,
see Romer (4).
Some of the most important science and technology policy
questions turn on the interaction of excludability and rivalry.
As noted above, for a rival good like a pasture, increased
excludability, induced by stronger property rights, leads to
greater economic efficiency. Stronger property rights induce
higher prices, and higher prices solve both the problem of
overuse and the problem of underprovision. However, for a
nonrival good, stronger property rights may not move the
economy in the right direction. When there are no property
rights,thepriceforagoodiszero.Thisleadstotheappropriate
utilization of an existing nonrival good but offers no incentives
for the discovery or production of new nonrival goods. Higher
prices ameliorate underprovision of the good (raising the
quantity supplied) but exacerbate its underutilization (dimin-
ishingthequantitydemanded).Ifscientistshadtopayaroyalty
fee to Waston and Crick for each use that they made of the
knowledge about the structure of DNA, less biomedical re-
search would be done.
The policy challenge posed by nonrival goods is therefore
muchmoredifficultthantheoneposedbyrivalgoods.Because
property rights support an efficient market in rival goods, the
‘‘theory of the first best’’ can guide policy with regard to such
goods. The first best policy is to strive to establish or mimic as
closely as possible an efficient market. For nonrival goods, in
contrast, policy must be guided by the less specific ‘‘theory of
the second best.’’ For these goods, it is impossible, even in
principle, to approach an efficient market outcome. A second
best policy, as the name suggests, is an inevitable but uneasy
compromise between conflicting imperatives.
The conceptual distinction between rivalry and excludability
is fundamental to any discussion of policy. Rivalry is an
intrinsic feature of a good, but excludability is determined to
an important extent by policy decisions. Under our legal
system, a mathematical formula is a type of nonrival good that
is intentionally made into a public good by making it nonex-
cludable. Someone who discovers such a formula cannot
receive patent or copyright protection for the discovery. A
software application is another nonrival good, but because
copyright protection renders it excludable, it is not a public
good. It is correct but not very helpful to observe that the
government should provide public goods. It does not resolve
the difficult question of which nonrival goods it should make
into public goods by denying property rights over these goods.
Beyond ‘‘the Market Versus the Government.’’ In many
discussions, the decision about whether a good should be made
into a public good is posed as a choice between the market and
the government. A more useful way to frame the discussion is
to start by asking when a pure price system (which may create
monopoly power) is a better institutional arrangement than a
pure tax and subsidy system, and vice versa.
By a pure price system we mean a system in which property
rights are permanent and owners freely set prices on their
goods. Under such a system, a firm that developed a novel
chemical with medicinal uses could secure the exclusive rights
to sell the chemical forever.
A pure tax and subsidy system represents a polar opposite.
Under this system, the good produced is not excludable, so a
producer cannot set prices or control how their output is used.
Production would be financed by the subsidy. Produced goods
are available to everyone for free. To clarify the policy issues
that arise in the choice between these two systems, our initial
discussion will be cast entirely in terms of a firm making
internal decisions about investment in research, avoiding any
reference to the public sector.
Financing Innovation Within the Firm. Picture a large
conglomerate with many divisions. Each division makes a
differenttypeofproductandoperatesasanindependentprofit
center. It pays for its inputs, charges for its outputs, and earns
its own profits. Senior managers, who are compensated partly
onthebasisoftheprofitstheirdivisionearns,haveanincentive
to work hard and make their division perform well.
To make the discussion specific, imagine that many of the
products made by different divisions are computer controlled.
Suppose also that some divisions within the firm make soft-
ware and others manufacture paper products, such as enve-
lopes. Both the software goods and the paper products may be
sold to other divisions. The interesting question for our
purposes is how senior managers price these internal sales.
Producing Paper Products. For rival goods like envelopes,
the ‘‘invisible hand’’ theorem applies to an internal market
within the firm just as it would to an external market: a pure
price system with strong property rights leads to efficient
outcomes. An efficient firm will tell the managers of the
envelope division that they are free to charge other divisions
whateverpricetheywantfortheseenvelopes.Providedthatthe
other divisions are free to choose between buying internally or
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maximize the profits of the firm. It is efficient for the internal
division to make envelopes if it can produce them at a lower
cost than an outside vendor. If not, the price system will force
them to stop. If senior management did not give the division
property rights over the envelopes and allowed all other
divisions to requisition unlimited envelopes without paying,
envelopes would be wasted on a massive scale. The firm would
suffer from an internal version of the tragedy of the commons.
Producing Software with a Price System. Now contrast the
analysis of envelopes with an analysis of software. Almost all
of the cost of producing software is up-front cost. When a
version of the computer code already exists, the cost of an
additionalcopyofthesoftwareisnearlyzero.Itisnearlyapure
nonrival good.
Suppose that one division has developed a new piece of
software that diagnoses hardware malfunctions better than any
previous product. This software would be useful for all of the
divisions that make computer-controlled products. Senior
managers could give property rights over the software to the
division that produced it, letting it set the price it charges other
divisions for the use of the software. Then the producer might
set a high price. Other divisions, however, will avoid using this
software if the price is so high that it depresses their own
profits. They might purchase a less expensive and less powerful
set of software diagnostic tools from an outside vendor. Both
of these outcomes lead to reductions in the conglomerate’s
overall profits. They are examples of what economists term
monopoly price distortions—underuse induced by prices that
are higher than the cost of producing an additional unit.
It would cost the shareholders of the conglomerate nothing
if this software were made freely available to all of the
divisions, and profits decrease if some divisions forgo the use
of the program and therefore fail to diagnose hardware
malfunctions properly or if they pay outside suppliers for
competing versions of diagnostic software.
Producing Software Under a Tax and Subsidy System.
Because software is a nonrival good, the best arrangement for
allocating an existing piece of software is to deny the division
that produced it internal property rights over it. This avoids
monopoly price distortions. Senior management could simply
announce that any other division in the conglomerate may use
the software without charge. But this kind of arrangement for
distributing software gives each division little incentive to
produce software that is useful to other divisions within the
firm.Itsolvestheunderutilizationproblembutexacerbatesthe
underprovision problem.
Senior management, foreseeing this difficulty, might there-
fore establish a system of taxes and subsidies. They could tax
the profits of each division, using the proceeds to subsidize an
operating division that develops new software for internal use.
They could even set up a separate research and development
division funded entirely from subsidies provided by headquar-
ters. This division’s discoveries would be given to the operating
divisions for free. Despite the statist connotation associated
with the concepts of taxes and subsidies, the managers and
owners of a private firm may adopt them because they increase
efficiency and lead to higher profits.
These arguments show that, in principle, taxes, subsidies,
and weak property rights can be an efficient arrangement for
organizing the production and distribution of goods like
software. However, subsidies have implicit costs. Managers
must ensure that the software produced under the terms of the
subsidy actually meets an important need within the other
divisions of the firm. To supervise a subsidized operation, they
mustestimatethevalueofitsoutputintheabsenceofanyprice
signals or arms-length transactions that reveal information
about willingness to pay. Operating divisions will accept any
piece of software that is offered for free, so the fact that a
subsidized software group seems to have a market for its goods
within the firm reveals almost nothing. This division might
write software that is worth far less to the conglomerate than
its cost of production. Thus, a subsidy system poses its own risk
to the profitability of the firm. Avoiding these risks imposes
serious measurement and supervisory costs on senior man-
agement, costs they need not incur when a division produces
a rival good and runs as a profit center. To supervise the
envelope division, senior managers only need to know whether
it earns a profit.
The taxes that headquarters imposes on the operating
divisions also create distortions. If the workers in a division
keep only a fraction of the benefits that result from their
efforts, they will not work as hard as they should to save costs
and raise productive efficiency. Taxes weaken incentives. If it
is too difficult for senior management to supervise the activ-
ities of software workers who receive subsidies, the distortion
in incentives resulting from a system of taxes and subsidies may
be more harmful than distortions resulting from operating the
software division as a monopolistic profit center.
The problem for this firm is a problem for any economic
entity. For rival goods like envelopes, a price system offers a
simple, efficient mechanism for making the right decisions
about production and distribution. For nonrival goods like
software, there is no simple, efficient system. Both price
systems and tax and subsidy systems can induce large ineffi-
ciencies. In any specific context, making the right second-best
choice between these pure systems or some intermediate
mixture requires detailed information about the relative mag-
nitudes of the associated efficiency costs.
FinancingInnovationfortheNationasaWhole.Atthelevel
of the nation, just as at the level of the firm, relative costs drive
choices between price systems and tax subsidy systems. The
major cost of the price system is monopoly price distortion,
which occurs when a good is sold at a price that exceeds
marginal cost.
Fig. 1 illustrates monopoly price distortion. The downward-
sloping demand curve shows how the total quantity purchased
varies with the price charged. The demand curve can also be
interpreted as a schedule of the willingness to pay for an
additional unit of the good as a function of the total number
of units that have already been purchased. As the number
already sold increases, the willingness to pay for one more unit
falls. The figure also charts the marginal cost of producing
additional units of output, assumed here to be constant, as well
as the price p* and quantity q* purchased when a monopolist
is free to set prices to maximize profits.
The triangle marked ‘‘Deadweight loss’’ represents the
dollar value of the welfare loss that results from setting price
above marginal cost: some people are willing to pay more than
FIG. 1. Monopoly price distortion.
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price. The resulting underconsumption can be overcome by
reducing the monopolist’s price to the level of marginal cost.
Expiration of a patent, by eliminating monopoly after a fixed
time, eventually solves this problem.
Monopoly pricing can cause another problem. The total
value to society of the good depicted here is the total area
underthedemandcurvelessthecosttosocietyoftheunitsthat
are produced. In the figure, the rectangle below the marginal
cost line marked ‘‘Variable cost’’ represents the production
costs for q* units of the good. The total value to society is the
sum of the willingnesses to pay of all people who purchase, or
the area under the demand curve up to the quantity q*. The
net value to society is the difference between these two areas,
which is equal to the rectangle marked ‘‘Producer profits’’ plus
the triangle marked ‘‘Consumer surplus.’’ This rectangle of
profits is the difference between the revenue from sales and
the variable cost of the goods produced. The surplus is a pure
gain captured by those consumers who pay less than the goods
are worth to them. Firms compare the profit rectangle to the
fixed research and development cost of introducing the good
when they evaluate a new product. They neglect the consumer
surplus that the new good will generate for purchasers. Thus
even under conditions of strong property rights and high
monopoly prices, there will be a tendency for the market to
underprovide valuable new goods.
When policymakers weigh the use of property rights and
monopolypowertofinancetheintroductionofnewgoods,they
must consider two other aspects of monopoly pricing that
change the size of the total distortions it creates. On the one
hand, price discrimination—the strategy of charging different
customers different prices—can mitigate or eliminate the
efficiency losses due to monopoly. On the other hand, the
efficiency losses from monopoly power become worse when
one monopolist sells to another.
A surprising implication of economic theory is that a
perfectly price-discriminating monopolist (i.e., one that
charges each consumer his exact willingness to pay) produces
the efficient (i.e., perfectly competitive) quantity of output. By
charging each consumer the exact amount that he would be
willing to pay, the monopolist continues to produce up to the
point where the value to the last consumer is equal to the
marginal cost of an additional unit of output. Thus, price
discrimination mitigates or completely solves the problem of
underuse. In addition, it helps solve the problem of under-
provision because it increases the total profit that a supplier of
a new good can capture. Price discrimination is widely used in
air travel (airlines usually charge more for the changeable
tickets likely to be used by business travelers) and telephone
services (which throughout the world charge businesses more
than individuals). Price discrimination also occurs in physician
and hospital services and in pharmaceutical and laboratory
supply sales. Recent legal challenges to the use of price
discrimination by pharmaceutical companies in their sales to
managed care organizations may unfortunately have limited
the use of this promising strategy for minimizing the losses
from monopoly pricing.
Monopolydistortionscanbecomelargerwhenproductionof
a good involves a chain of monopolists. For example, suppose
that one monopolist invents a new laboratory technique, and
a second develops a new drug whose production uses this
technique. When two or more monopolists trade in this kind
of vertical chain, the welfare losses do not just add up, they
multiply. The problems of underuse and failure to develop the
good both become worse than they would be if a single
monopolist invented the technique, developed products from
it, and priced the goods to the final consumers. This is the
justification that economists typically offer for vertical inte-
gration of an upstream and a downstream firm into a single
firm. However, in an area that is research intensive and subject
to uncertainty, and where there are many possible users of any
innovation, vertical integration is often unfeasible. Chiron,
which held a monopoly in the use of a critical enzyme for PCR,
would have been unable to identify, much less integrate into a
single firm, all of the possible firms that could use PCR before
it made its decisions about developing this technique. On these
grounds, theory suggests that a single monopolist in a final-
product market will induce smaller social losses than a mo-
nopolist that will play a crucial supplier role to other firms,
which are themselves monopolists in downstream markets.
TaxesandSubsidiesCauseaDifferentSetofDistortions.As
we have noted, the polar alternative to a pure price system is
an allocation mechanism that relies on subsidies to finance
innovation. The funds required for a system of government
subsidies can be raised only by taxation, which harms incen-
tives. For example, raising the income tax diminishes the
incentives to work. In addition, subsidies replace a market test
with a nonmarket system that rewards a different set of
activities. If these activities are not useful or productive, the
subsidies themselves induce distortions and waste. To describe
the costs associated with a subsidy system, recall the case of the
subsidized software-producing division of the conglomerate. It
is costly to design and operate an administrative system that
tries to identify useful activities. Failures in such a system also
impose costs. Suppose that many of the projects that are
subsidized produce no value; suppose further that a system
which relied on a market test of value produced fewer such
failures. Then funds allocated to the additional wasteful
projects must be counted as part of the cost of operating the
subsidy system. Under conditions of uncertainty, any alloca-
tion system will produce some failures; in this example, we
assume that a subsidy system would produce more of them.
Peer review of university-based research grants is widely
regarded as an unusually efficient and effective mechanism of
subsidy allocation. Its effectiveness derives partly from the
details of its structure, such as the anonymous reviews by
panels of disinterested experts. However, it also benefits from
the limited problem that it is trying to solve. Research review
groups make decisions at a high level of abstraction; they do
not need to forecast the precise consequences of pursuing a
line of research, and do not need much information about the
‘‘market demand’’ for the good they are ultimately subsidizing.
Consider, for example, the information necessary to make a
good decision about subsidizing different research proposals
for research on computer–human interfaces. Then contrast
this with the substantially greater amount of information that
would be necessary for selecting among several proposals to
develop new software applications that will be sold to the
public. The information needed to make decisions about final
products is extensive, including detailed information about
characteristics and their value in the myriad ways that con-
sumers might put them to use. Surely a market test by people
who spend their own money is the most efficient mechanism
for selecting products in this setting. (To push this point to an
extreme,imaginewhatrecreationalreadingwouldbelikeifthe
governmentdidnotoffercopyrightprotectionofbooks,sothat
the only people who could make a living as authors were
people who received grants awarded on the basis of relevancy
by university professors!)
Debate about technology policy programs often turns on
disagreements about the cost of setting up and operating a
system for allocating subsidies. Views in this area are often
polarized,butthereislittledisagreementthatitismuchharder
to establish effective subsidies for narrowly defined final
products from an industry than it is to subsidize flexible inputs
for that industry and let a market test determine how they are
allocated to produce the final product mix. Arguably, the most
important contribution the federal government made to the
development of the biotechnology industry was to promote
training for people who went to work in molecular biology and
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computer science, which provided the software industry with
a pool of talented developers and entrepreneurs, have prob-
ably been more effective mechanisms for promoting the de-
velopment of the software industry than government attempts
to promote specific computer languages. The one possible
exception to this rule arises when the government is an
important user of the good in question, as for example in the
case of military equipment. In this case, users within the
government have much information about the relevant market
demand and can be more successful at selecting specific
products to subsidize.
Measuring the Gains from Research and the Costs of
Financing It. To make informed decisions about research
support, and to strike an appropriate balance between ex-
panded property rights and subsidies, policymakers need
quantitative information that will enable them to answer three
questions.(i)Whatarethebenefitsofanadditionalinvestment
in research? (ii) What are the costs of financing research
through a system of property rights that depends on monopoly
profits as the principal incentive? (iii) What are the costs of
financingresearchthroughasystemoftaxesandsubsidies?We
discuss each of these questions, then address some of the
pitfalls that may arise in making decisions based on incomplete
or misleading information.
Measuring Benefits. The problem of measuring the benefits
from research expenditures can be readily posed in terms of
the demand curve of Fig. 1. The full benefit to society from
research leading to a new discovery is represented by the area
under the demand curve up to the quantity of goods sold. If we
subtract the variable costs of producing the units sold, we have
a measure of benefits that can be compared with the research
costs needed to generate this benefit. There are then two ways
toproceed.Policymakerscanuseanestimateofprofitstofirms
as a crude underestimate of the total gains to society. Alter-
natively, they can try to measure these gains directly by looking
at the benefits enjoyed by users of the goods.
Profits as a Proxy for Social Benefits. To keep the discus-
sion simple, assume that a firm made a fixed investment in
research sometime in the past. Each year, it earns revenue on
sales of the product produced from this research and pays the
variable costs of goods produced. The difference, the annual
accounting profits of the firm, appears as the profit rectangle
in Fig. 1. These profits change over time. The value of the
innovation will change as substitute goods are developed,
prices for other goods rise or fall, and knowledge about the
innovation grows. Accounting profits of firms can thus be used
as a lower-bound estimate of the welfare gains from innovation.
In practice, there are several obvious problems with this
approach. First, by ignoring consumer surplus, this measure
underestimates the benefits of a good. Second, it may be
impossible for a government agency (unlike the manufacturer)
toestimatetherevenuesattributabletoasingleproduct.Third,
until a product has run the course of its useful life, its entire
revenue stream will be highly uncertain. At an early stage in
the life of a new product, such as a patented drug, the stock
marketvaluationofthecompanymaybetakenasanindication
of the best estimate of the present value of all the revenue
streamsheldbythefirm,andchangesinstockmarketvaluation
when a new product is approved may give some indication of
the present value of the anticipated revenue stream from the
good. But if the possibility of approval is anticipated by the
stock market, the change in stock market value at the time of
approval will be an underestimate of the full value of this
revenue stream.
Finally, market transactions will not give an accurate indi-
cation of willingness to pay if demand for a good is subsidized.
Traditional fee-for-service medical insurance acts as such a
subsidy (5). Then patients bear only a fraction of the cost
directly, and consume drugs and health services whose value
falls short of the true social cost. In this situation, the monop-
olist’s profits from the sale of the innovation overstate the
magnitude of the benefits to society of a newly invented
medical treatment.
Cost–Benefit Approach. A more complete picture of the
benefits to society can be painted using cost–benefit measures
of the total value to consumers of a new good. Consider the
value of the discovery that aspirin prevents myocardial infarc-
tion (6). What is the information worth? To answer this
question, one begins by considering the size of population that
would benefit from the therapy, followed by the change in the
expected pattern of morbidity and mortality attributable to
adoption, and finally the dollar valuation of both the survival
and quality-of-life effects. This would represent the potential
return and could be calculated on an annual basis, but the
potential return would likely overestimate the actual surplus.
Somepeopleinthegroupatrisk,forexample,mighthavebeen
taking aspirin before the information from the studies became
available. Furthermore, not everyone who could potentially
benefit would comply with treatment. Thus, it is necessary to
estimate the increment in the number of people using the
therapy rather than the potential number of individuals taking
it. In addition, there would likely be reductions in expenditures
for the treatment of heart attacks, which, after all, would be
averted by use of the therapy. Essentially, the estimate of the
surplus would be based on a CBA, perhaps conducted for the
representative candidates for treatment, multiplied by the
number of people who undergo treatment as a direct conse-
quence of the information provided by the clinical trial.
AlthoughthetechniquesofCBAhavebeenadoptedinmany
areas of public policy, most ‘‘economic’’ analyses of health care
and health practices have eschewed CBA for the related
technique of cost-effectiveness analysis, which, unlike CBA,
does not attempt to value health outcomes in dollar terms (7).
Instead, outcomes are evaluated as units of health (typically
life expectancy or quality-adjusted life years). The lack of a
dollarmeasureofvalueofoutputmeansthatcost-effectiveness
analysis does not provide a direct measure of consumer
surplus. However, if the cost-effectiveness analysis is con-
ducted properly, it is often possible to convert the information
from a cost-effectiveness analysis into a CBA with additional
information about the value of the unit change in health
outcomes.Forexample,supposethatthevalueofanadditional
year of life expectancy is deemed to be $100,000, and that a
patient with severe three-vessel coronary artery disease
treated with bypass surgery can expect to live two years longer
at a cost (in excess of medical management) of $45,000. The
cost-effectiveness ratio of surgery, or the increment in costs
($45,000) divided by the increment in health effects (two
years), is $22,500. The net benefit of surgery is the dollar value
oftheincreasedlifeexpectancy($200,000)lesstheincremental
cost ($45,000), or $155,000. Calculations like these are a central
feature of the field of medical technology assessment (8).
Usually the information needed to construct exact measures
of the value of medical research will not be available, but crude
calculations can be illuminating. Moreover, basic investments
in information collection, for example, surveys of representa-
tive panels of potential consumers, might greatly improve the
accuracy of these estimates. Simple calculations like these,
together with more systematic data on health outcomes for the
population at large, are among the prerequisites for better
decision-making by the government.
Measuring the Cost of Using the Price System and Monop-
oly Profits. Benefit measures comprise only part of the infor-
mation needed for good decision-making. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that policymakers anticipate a large benefit from research
directed toward the prevention of a specific disease. They must
also decide whether this research should be subsidized by the
government or financed by granting monopoly power to pri-
vate sector firms.
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identified some of the factors that can influence the social cost
of using monopoly power to motivate private research efforts.
Monopoly will be more costly if there are many firms with
some monopoly power that sell to each other in a vertical
chain. In principle, this second problem might be serious for an
industry that is research-based, particularly if current trends
toward granting patents on many kinds of basic and applied
scientific knowledge continue. For example, a drug may be
produced by the application of a sequence of patented funda-
mental processes that results in production of a reagent. The
reagent may then be combined with other chemicals to pro-
duce a drug. If access to the process is sold by a monopoly, the
reagent is sold by another monopoly, and the drug is sold by
a third monopoly, the distortion due to monopoly will be
compounded. Strengthened property rights can mean, in the
limit, that an arbitrarily large number of people or firms with
patent rights over various pieces of knowledge will each have
veto power over any subsequent developments. If one firm had
control of all these processes and carried out all these func-
tions, the price distortion for the final product would be
smaller, but as we have indicated, in a research-intensive field
characterized by much uncertainty and a large number of small
start-up firms, this arrangement may not be feasible.
Yet as we have also indicated, monopoly will be less costly
to society as a whole if firms can take advantage of price
discrimination.Becausethecostofmorerelianceonmonopoly
makes this issue so important to a research-intensive field such
aspharmaceuticalsandbecausesolittleisknownaboutthenet
effect of these two conflicting forces, we believe that it would
be valuable to collect more information about the magnitude
of monopoly distortions in fields closely related to health care.
Below, we describe feasible mechanisms that could be used
to collect more of this kind of information. There are real
challenges to collecting the information, because much of
it—such as the prices that hospitals and health care networks
pay for drugs—is a trade secret.
Monopoly distortions are not the only costs incurred when
the private sector finances research; the cost of establishing
and maintaining property rights may be substantial. Enforce-
ment of property rights is inexpensive for most physical
objects, such as cars or houses. But for nonrival goods that can
readily be copied and used surreptitiously, it is much more
costly to extend property rights, and more subtle mechanisms
may be needed to do so. Initially, software publishers relied on
copy protection schemes to prevent revenue losses from
unauthorized copying. Over time, they have developed less
intrusive techniques (such as restricting technical assistance to
registered customers) that achieve the same end.
Sometimes the costs of enforcing property rights are so high
that a system based on private incentives will be infeasible.
These cases will therefore have high priority for scarce tax-
payer financed government subsidies. Suppose that a private
firm decided to sponsor a trial of aspirin to prevent colon
cancer and sought the permission of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to have exclusive rights to market the
use of aspirin for this purpose. Although the company might
establish effectiveness and obtain exclusive rights from the
FDA, the availability of aspirin from many producers and
without a prescription, along with the large number of indi-
cations for its use, would make it nearly impossible to enforce
market exclusivity for this indication. In such an extreme case,
measuring the costs of enforcement is unnecessary, but there
often will be instances in which such estimates will be needed
because enforcement of property rights is worthwhile but
costly. Moreover, as the software example suggests, there is
muchroomforexperimentingwithdifferentsystemstoprotect
property rights.
Cost of Using Taxes and Subsidies. Most of the field of
public finance is concerned with quantifying the losses and
gains that occur with government activity, such as taxation.
Every form of taxation alters behavior by distorting economic
incentives; for example, taxes on bequests reduce the desired
size of a bequest, reduce national savings, and increase trans-
fersofwealthduringlife.Incometaxationmodifiestherelative
attractiveness of time devoted to leisure and time devoted to
paid work. Traditional calculations of the benefits of govern-
ment programs in health care, however, ignore the ‘‘dead-
weight’’ losses due to the behavioral distortions induced by
taxation. These losses can be substantial, although their exact
magnitude depends on the form of the tax and the economic
activity to which it applies. According to the recent estimates,
the 1993 personal tax rate increases raised the deadweight loss
by about two dollars for every additional dollar of tax revenue
(9). These are part of the costs of a tax and subsidy system.
A government subsidy system, like that of a large firm, can
generate extensive administrative costs. It can also cause large
quantities of resources to be wasted on poorly selected
projects. A government agency that dispenses research dollars
must devote substantial time and effort to choosing among
several competing projects. The market directly produces a
mechanism (albeit a Darwinian mechanism that may not be
costless) to sort among competing uses of resources. Little is
known about the costs of a system to administer subsidies.
However, as the previous discussion suggested, qualitative
evidence suggests that subsidy systems work better when they
make general investments in outputs that are flexible and have
many uses. They are less suitable for specific, inflexible
investments that require extensive, context-specific informa-
tion about benefits and willingness to pay.
Making Decisions with Incomplete Information. Because
many of the pieces of information that we have outlined above
are not available or are available only in the form of qualitative
judgments made by experts, it is tempting to substitute surro-
gate measures for which the information is available. For
example, one might simply give up any hope of making
judgments about the magnitudes of costs and benefits of
various strategies for supporting advances in health care. The
NIH might simply try to produce the best biomedical science
possible and assume that everything else will follow. But as
Rosenberg has noted (10), a country’s success in producing
Nobel Prizes in scientific fields is inversely correlated with its
economic performance!
More seriously, other seemingly reliable measures could
significantly bias government decisions. For example, because
profits are observable and salient in political debates, a
government agency that subsidizes research may want to
maximize profits earned by firms that draw on their research.
For NIH, this might mean adopting a strategy that maximizes
the profits earned by biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms
in the United States. Because a substantial portion of the
demand for medical care is still subsidized by a system of
fee-for-service-insurance, this strategy could lead to large
social losses. Even under the paradigm of managed care, which
removes or decreases the implicit subsidy for medical care
services, profits can be a poor guide to policy. The highest
payoff to government spending on research may come from
funding research in areas where it is prohibitively expensive to
establishthesystemofpropertyrightsthatmakesprivateprofit
possible.
A prominent example of this phenomenon, mentioned
above, is the discovery that aspirin can prevent heart attacks
and death from heart attacks (11). It is difficult to conceive of
realistic circumstances in which a producer of aspirin could
gain exclusive rights to sell aspirin for this indication, and it is
unlikely that the discovery that aspirin had such beneficial
effects markedly increased the profits of its producers. More-
over, since aspirin is produced by many firms, no one of them
had much to gain by financing this kind of research. But if the
increased profit in this case was small, the consumer’s surplus
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noted, it is precisely in circumstances under which a producer
cannot recoup the fixed costs of investment in developing a
technology that government research may have its greatest
payoffs. (In this context, the research established aspirin’s
beneficial effects on heart disease rather than proving the
safety and efficacy of the drug more generally.) In such
circumstances, it is imperative to go beyond profits and
measure consumer’s surplus, but the usual market-based prox-
ies may provide very little information about any such benefits.
Public good features also lent a strong presumption that it
was appropriate for the government to sponsor research on the
value of beta-blockers after myocardial infarction (12, 13). In
the influential NIH-sponsored Beta-Blocker Heart Attack
Trial, propranolol reduced mortality by about 25%. The
excludability and property rights problems characteristic of
aspirin would seem to have been less important for propran-
olol, but the combination of looming patent expiration and the
availability of a growing number of close substitutes dimin-
ished the incentives for a private company to sponsor such a
trial. Any increase in demand for beta-blockers resulting from
the research would likely have applied to the class generally.
Although strengthened property rights (such as lengthened
market exclusivity) might have made it possible for a private
company to capture more of the demand increase resulting
from such research, problems with enforcement are similar to
those of aspirin: it would be difficult to ensure that other
beta-blockers would not be prescribed for the same indication,
diluting the return to the manufacturer of propranolol.
The drug alglucerase, for the treatment of Gaucher disease,
has characteristics almost opposite to those of aspirin and
beta-blockers. Gaucher disease is caused by deficient activity
of the enzyme glucocerebrosidase, and NIH-sponsored re-
search led to discovery of the enzyme defect and the devel-
opment of alglucerase, a modified form of the naturally
occurring enzyme.
Subsequently, a private corporation (Genzyme) developed
alglucerase further and received exclusive rights to market the
compound under the provisions of the Orphan Drug Act. Thus
in this instance, both a tax subsidy and a strong property rights
approach facilitated the development of the drug.
The high price of alglucerase attracted substantial attention,
particularly because most of the drug’s development had been
sponsored or conducted by the government. The standard
dosageregimendevisedbytheNIHcostwellover$300,000per
year for an adult patient, and therapy is lifelong. According to
the manufacturer, the marginal cost of producing the drug
accounted for more than half the price, a ratio that is unusually
highforapharmaceuticalproduct(14).Althoughdrug-sparing
regimens that appear to be as effective have since been tested,
the least expensive of these cost tens of thousands of dollars
annually (15). The supplier was able to charge high prices
because there is no effective substitute for the drug. This
meant that nearly all insurers and managed care organizations
covered the drug at any price the manufacturer demanded.
Insurance coverage meant that demand would not fall signif-
icantly with increases in price, so that monopoly would not
cause as much underutilization as would be typical if demand
werehighlyprice-responsive.Withtheinsurancesubsidy,there
would be overconsumption, and expenditures on the drug
could exceed the value of benefits it provided.
At current prices, alglucerase is unlikely to be cost-effective
compared with many widely accepted health care interven-
tions. An exploration of the federal role in the development of
alglucerase revealed the hurdles to be overcome in obtaining
the information needed to guide public decision-making—it
was possible to obtain rough estimates of the private compa-
ny’s research and development investment but not the invest-
ment made by the federal government. Nevertheless, precise
information about the costs of research are often, as in this
case, unnecessary to make qualitative decisions about the
appropriateness of the taxation and subsidy approach (14).
More detailed information about the relative costs of public
and private support for various forms of research can be
valuable for many reasons. It may overturn long-standing
presumptions about the best kind of research for the govern-
ment to support. The traditional view is that Nobel Prize-
winning science is the area where government support is most
important. However, as the case of PCR demonstrates, it is
now clear that it is possible to offer property rights that can
generate very large profits to a firm that makes a Nobel
Prize-winning discovery. It may not be as costly to set up a
system of property rights for basic scientific discoveries as
many people have presumed. If so, we must still verify whether
the costs of relying on monopoly distortions for this kind of
discovery are particularly high. At present, we have little basis
for making this judgment.
In an era when research budgets are stagnant or shrinking,
circumstances will force this kind of judgment. Much popula-
tion-based research, including epidemiological research and
social science research, could provide valuable information
(providing insights in such areas as etiologic factors in human
disease, biological adaptations to aging, and understanding of
the economic consequences of disease and its treatment). This
information could inform both public policy and individual
planning. All such information is nonrival, and much of it may
be inherently nonexcludable because it would be so costly to
establish a system of property rights. It is precisely in the areas
of research that produce knowledge which is not embodied in
a specific product that the benefits from federal investment are
likely to be greatest, but most difficult to measure. With a fixed
budget, a decision to fund work that could be financed in the
private sector—such as sequencing the human genome—
means that competing proposals for population-based or ep-
idemiological research cannot be funded. The choice between
these kinds of alternatives should be based on an assessment
of the best available evidence on all the benefits and costs.
Using Experimentation to Inform Decisions About Re-
search Financing. In many studies of clinical interventions, it
is feasible to construct rough estimates of the social returns to
government investment in research. As we noted above, it is
considerably more difficult to estimate the costs of different
systems for financing research. Does this mean that no mea-
surement is possible and that debates about financing mech-
anisms should be driven by tradition, belief, and politics rather
than by evidence? Undoubtedly, measurement can be im-
proved by devoting more resources to it and engaging more
intensively in standard activities to measure proxies for re-
search productivity (citation analysis, tracing the relationship
of products to research findings, and so on). Even if such
activitiesresultincredibleestimatesofthebenefitsofresearch,
they tend not to address the principal policy issue: what mix of
private and public financing is best? To answer this question,
consideration should be given to the collection of new kinds of
data and even to feasible large-scale social experiments.
A provocative experiment that could be designed along
these lines would be one that ‘‘auctioned off the exploration
rights’’ along a portion of the human genome. Another portion
of the genome could be selected for comparison; here the
government could refuse to allow patent protection for basic
results like gene sequences, and would offer instead to subsi-
dize research on sequencing and on genetic therapies. If two
large regions were selected at random, the difference in the
rate of development of new therapies between the privately
owned and the public regions and the differences in the total
cost of developing these therapies could give us valuable
information about the relative costs and social benefits of
different financing mechanisms.
The experimental approach is unlikely to settle all issues
about the appropriate federal role in funding research. In a
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privatesectorandtheothertofederallysponsoredresearchers,
differences in outcomes could be due to characteristics of the
regions that were randomly assigned (and random assignment
would not eliminate chance variation if the regions were too
small). But many insights might emerge from such an effort,
including the identification of cost consequences, the effect of
funding source on ultimate access to resulting technological
innovations, the dissemination of research results, the effec-
tiveness of private sector firms in exploiting price discrimina-
tion, and so on. The scope for conducting such experiments
might be large, and should be targeted toward those areas of
research in which there is genuine uncertainty about the
appropriate allocation between property rights and taxes and
subsidy.
A more conservative strategy would be to collect detailed
information about natural experiments such as the discovery
and patenting of PCR. It would be very useful to have even
ballpark estimates of the total monopoly price distortions
induced by the evolving pricing policy being used by the patent
holder.
Conclusions
Federal agencies often use estimates of industry revenues or
consumer surplus to make claims about benefits or returns to
their investments in scientific and technological research.
Though these components of research productivity are impor-
tant, they are inadequate as a basis for setting and evaluating
government policy toward research. Our discussion has em-
phasized the choice between property rights and a system of
taxes and subsidy (i.e., government sponsorship) for research.
This decision is not made at the level of NIH or any other
agency that sponsors and conducts research, but it is funda-
mental to public policy.
It may be tempting to dismiss these issues because it is so
difficult to estimate the quantities that we identify as being
central to decisions about government support for research.
However, it would not be difficult to make rough estimates of
these quantities and to begin to use them in policy discussions.
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to select among the alternative
mechanisms for supporting research. Nevertheless, decisions
about the use of these mechanisms are made every time the
government makes spending and property rights decisions
relevant for science and technology policy issues. The effort
required to obtain the needed information and consider these
issues systematically might pay a large social return.
In coming years, three forces will increase the importance of
taking this broad perspective on the federal role in supporting
research. First, voters and politicians are likely to attribute a
higher cost to taxes and deficit finance. As a result, in future
years all federal agencies will likely be forced to rely less on the
tax and subsidy mechanism for supporting technological
progress than they have in the past.
Second, a dramatic reduction in the cost of information
processing systems will increasingly affect all aspects of eco-
nomic activity. This change will make it easier to set up new
systems of property rights, which can be used to give private
firms an incentive to produce goods that traditionally could be
provided only by the government. The rapid development of
the Internet as a medium of communication may ultimately
lead to advances in the ability to track and price a whole new
range of intellectual property. The success of the software
industry also suggests that other kinds of innovations in areas
such as marketing may make it possible for private firms to
earn profits from goods even when property rights to the goods
they produce seem quite weak.
At the same time, a third force—the move toward managed
careinthedeliveryofhealthcareservices—pushesintheother
direction. This change in the market for health care services is
desirable on many grounds, but to the extent that it reduces
utilization of some medical technologies, it will have the
undesirable side effect of diminishing private sector incentives
to conduct research leading to innovations in health care.
Everything else equal, this change calls for increased public
support for biomedical research. In the near term, the best
policy response may therefore be one that combines expanded
government support for research in some areas with stronger
property rights and a shift toward more reliance on the private
sector in other areas. Further work is needed to give precise,
quantitative guidance to striking the right balance. In the face
of stagnant or declining resources, we will have to make
increasedeffortstogatherandanalyzetheinformationneeded
totargetresearchactivitiesforsubsidyandtolearnwhichareas
the private sector is likely to pursue most effectively.
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